

University of Freiburg, Germany
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Distributed Systems

Chapter 2 System Models

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
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2.3.3: Security Model

The security of a distributed system


can be achieved by securing the processes and the interaction channels and by protecting the objects they encapsulate against unauthorized access.

- Protecting objects
 - access rights
 - an authority (user or process), called *principal*, grants the access to the objects
- securing processes and interactions
 - messages are exposed to attacks
 - processes expose their interfaces
 - enable invocations



2.3.3: Security Model: The enemy

- threats to processes
 - e.g. IP lacks the reliable knowledge of the source of messages
 - Servers, e.g. mail-server delivers e-mail to attacker
 - Clients, e.g. fake GSM radio station captures secret phone calls
- threats to communication channels
 - enemy copies, alters, injects messages
 - enemy saves copies of messages and replays them later
 - such attacks can be defeated by the use of secure channels
- denial of service



from *Distributed Systems – Concepts and Design*, Coulouris, Dollimore, Kindberg

2.3.3: Security Model: Defeating Security Threats

$$P \neq NP$$

■ Cryptography: the science of keeping messages secure

- ■ symmetric encryption
- ■ public-key encryption
- ■ challenge-response protocols

$$P \neq n$$

■ Authentication


- shared secrets
- public-key encryption

■ Secure channels

- process know reliably the identity of the principle
- ensure privacy and integrity of the data
- include physical or logical time stamps

■ Other threats: denial of service and mobile code

$$15 = 3 \cdot 5 \rightarrow \text{RSA}$$



End of Section 2

